ABSTRACT In this paper, we introduce a new family of lattices, namely QC-MDPC lattices, which are a special case of LDPC lattices, and an improved bit flipping algorithm for decoding of these lattices. Encoding and decoding implementations of QC-MDPC lattices are practical in high dimensions. Indeed, to take advantage of practical decoding, we use ''Construction-A'' lattices which makes a tight connection between the structure of lattices and codes. Using these features, we design a lattice-based public key encryption scheme enjoying linear encryption and decryption complexities. The proposed scheme has a reasonable key size due to the sparseness of the parity-check matrix, and the quasi-cyclic structure of the parity-check and generator matrices. Besides, the message expansion of the proposed scheme is smaller than other latticebased and code-based cryptosystems with comparative parameters. All these features provide a lattice-based public key encryption scheme with reasonable key size, linear encryption, and decryption algorithms and small message expansion. On the other hand, we show that the cryptosystem is resistant against all known attacks both on lattice-based and code-based cryptosystems for different levels of security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most number-theoretic cryptosystems which rely on the hardness of the integer factorization or discrete logarithm problems, become insecure in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Indeed, all these problems are solved through the implementation of quantum algorithms mainly Shor's algorithm [1] . Therefore, the research trends have changed into quantum safe cryptographic primitives. Two promising families of public key cryptosystems in post-quantum cryptography for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known to date are lattice-based and code-based cryptosystems.
Lattice-based cryptosystems (LBC) are designed based on conjectured hard problems on lattices such as the shortest vector problem (SVP), the closest vector problem (CVP), the short integer solution (SIS) and learning with errors (LWE) problems, which are hard on the worst case even in a quantum environment [2] . Due to the apparent efficiency of implementing lattice-based cryptosystems and strong security properties of some lattice-based cryptosystems, they have received wide attention and are promising candidate to post quantum cryptography.
Ajtai-Dwork (AD) [3] , and Goldreich-GoldwasserHalevi (GGH) cryptosystems [4] are two well-known proposals in lattice-based cryptography. Other lattice-based cryptosystems were designed along their lines. Although AD cryptosystem enjoys provable security, it is rather impractical. In contrast, the GGH scheme suggests a practical encryption scheme without provable security. For improving the efficiency and security of this scheme Micciancio proposed Hermit Normal Form (HNF) of the generator matrix as its public key [5] . However, it also has several shortcomings such as large public/private key size and high encryption/decryption running time.
NTRUEncrypt is a public key encryption scheme based on arithmetics in polynomial rings [6] . It is one of the practical lattice-based encryption scheme without having strong security proof. More efficient version of NTRU cryptosystem are available in literature [7] . In [8] , Regev has introduced a public key encryption scheme based on the hardness of the LWE problem. This scheme has a very strong security guarantee in the cost of huge public key size which requires computational complexity that is at least quadratic in the main security parameter. For avoiding this inefficiency a public key encryption scheme was presented by Lyubashevsky et al., using a ring-based variant of LWE problem (RLWE) that is proven to be hard as worstcase problems in ideal lattices [9] . The ring based schemes in lattice-based cryptosystems promise high efficiency in time and space complexities which are quasi-linear in the security parameter. However, lattice-based schemes still require more attempts to become practical.
Code-based cryptosystems (CBC) have been developed in another direction. They are designed based on the difficulty of decoding a random linear code [10] . The first code-based public key cryptosystem was introduced by McEliece using Goppa codes. This method uses very large key sizes that turns it impractical. Then, several McEliece-like schemes have been designed to reduce the key sizes. They choose codes with a large automorphism group, such as quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic codes. However, a structural algebraic attack succeeds in breaking many of them.
In 2007, capacity approaching codes like quasi-cyclic (QC) low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes have been used instead of Goppa codes in the McEliece cryptosystem [11] . It has been claimed that the modified cryptosystem resists against all known attacks and achieve very small public keys compared to the original McEliece, due to the quasi-cyclic structure of the codes. However, Otmani et al. have shown that this scheme has serious vulnerabilities [12] . In [13] , Baldi et al. improved the previous version and proposed a cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC codes which is immune against the Otmani et al. ' s attack when the block size is odd [14] . Misoczki et al. proposed the use of (quasi-cyclic) moderate density parity-check ((QC-)MDPC) codes [15] in CBCs. They claimed that it has more compact key and resists to the previous attacks [16] . Their cryptosystem is now known as the (QC)-MDPC-McEliece cryptosystem. This cryptosystem became the most efficient CBC (having smallest key size) and many papers have dealt with its implementation in hardware as well as side-channel protection. Unfortunately, a key recovery attack on (QC)-MDPC-McEliece cryptosystem has been presented in [17] . The proposed attack recovers the secret key from the failure probability of the bit-flipping algorithm very efficiently. Recently, it is shown that a similar dependency between the secret keys in the QC-LDPC code based cryptosystem in [13] and the failure probability of a decoding algorithm exist, even when a soft-decision decoding algorithm is used [18] .
An improvement of the code-based encryption scheme based on QC-MDPC code is presented in [19] , which uses a real noise vector in the encryption process. It is conjectured that this scheme is secure against the recent attacks in [17] and [18] , due to the Euclidian structure of the noise vector.
Following a similar guideline used in the evolution of codebased cryptosystems, designing lattice-based cryptosystems is a promising research area. Indeed, using a family of lattices that are easily decodable for a legitimate receiver and lead to an efficient encryption scheme that enjoys small key size is an interesting problem in the lattice-based cryptography.
Recently, a public key encryption scheme has been proposed based on Low Density Lattice Codes (LDLCs) [20] that improves efficiency of GGH cryptosystem [21] . However, the public key size of the proposed cryptosystem is still large and its space and time complexities are quadratic in terms of the security parameter.
First family of modern lattices, so-called LDPC lattice, are constructed based on Construction-D lattices along binary linear LDPC codes [22] - [25] . These lattices have some suboptimal iterative decoding algorithms such as minsum algorithm and sum-product algorithm (SPA) in high dimensions [22] , [26] , [27] . The decoding complexity of these algorithms is linear in terms of the lattice dimension. Therefore, CVP is efficiently solvable in these lattices even in high dimensions. Thus, they are promising candidates for lattice-based cryptosystems.
In this paper, we introduce a new public key encryption scheme based on a special sub-class of LDPC lattices, the so-called QC-LDPC lattices [28] . These lattices exploit Construction-A lattices [29] together with a QC-LDPC code [30] as their underlying code. The QC-LDPC lattices have many applications in the wireless communications [31] - [33] as well as designing a secret key encryption scheme [34] . These lattices have practical encoder and decoder with linear complexities in terms of the lattice dimension. Therefore, the time and the space requirements for the proposed public key encryption scheme are linear in terms of security parameter while in the most practical LBC they are quasi-linear. Moreover, the sparseness of the parity-check matrix and the quasi cyclic structure of the parity-check and the generator matrices of these lattices lead to design a public key encryption scheme with a smaller key size.
Due to the special structure of QC-LDPC lattices, some code-based attacks such as dual code attack are possible against a scheme based on these lattices. Therefore, in this paper we introduce QC-MDPC lattices and present a new message passing algorithm, the bit flipping algorithm, for decoding these lattices. It is shown that our proposed scheme is secure against all possible well-known attacks on CBCs and LBCs.
From the efficiency point of view, the new scheme improves previous GGH proposal in the same level of security and reduces both the time and the space requirements. In one side, the improved efficiency in decryption process allows us to use bigger values of the security parameter. On the other side, the generator matrix of the QC-MDPC lattice which corresponds to the public key, gives no information about the structure of the secret lattice. Thus, the fast decoding algorithm for the secret lattice cannot be obtained from the public key. Therefore, an attacker tries to find the CVP to the given ciphertext. This entails using Babai's nearest plane algorithm in high dimension [35] which is infeasible.
Consequently, the main limits of the GGH cryptosystem, i.e., high public key size and high implementation complexity, are dismissed by our proposed cryptosystem. Moreover, our scheme is simpler and faster than GGH cryptosystem and also those systems using modular exponentiation. The proposed encryption scheme has the following advantages:
• linear time and space complexities of encryption and decryption in terms of the security parameter (lattice dimension),
• reasonable reduction in the key size of the lattice-based cryptosystems,
• the smallest message expansion comparing to the other lattice-based and code-based cryptosystems. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the required definitions of QC-MDPC lattices and a new decoding algorithm. Section III contains our proposed encryption scheme based on QC-MDPC lattices. In Section IV, we provide the security analysis of our cryptosystem against the well-known attacks. Section V presents some practical values for security parameters corresponding to the standard security levels and the details related to the key sizes. Computational complexity of the cryptosystem comparing to the other LBCs and CBCs is presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII contains the concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations in this paper: bold lowercase letters for vectors, bold uppercase letters for matrices, a i is the i-th element of the vector a, b i is the i-th row of the matrix B, b i,j is the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix B, x is the nearest integer to x, x is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x, [ · ] t denotes the transposition operation for vectors and matrices and HNF(B) denotes the Hermite normal form of the matrix B.
A. LATTICES
Let R m be the m-dimensional real vector space with Euclidean norm. A lattice is defined as a discrete additive subgroup of R m . Every lattice is presented by integer combinations of some linearly independent basis vectors [29] . Let b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ∈ R m , be the basis vectors of the lattice , where
is a generator matrix for the lattice . In this context, the lattice is defined as
If m = n, the lattice is full rank. The determinant (or volume) of the lattice is defined as
and if the lattice is full rank, det = |det(B)|. The volumeto-noise ratio of the lattice is defined as
For more details about lattices and their properties, see [29] . Let B be a basis for the full rank lattice . The orthogonality defect of B is defined as
where b i is the Euclidean norm of the i-th row in B.
According to the Hadamard inequality, det(B) ≤ n i=1 b i and then orth-defect(B) ≥ 1. It can be shown that orth-defect(B) = 1 if and only if B is an orthogonal matrix [36] .
There are many ways to construct lattices from codes [29] . In our work Construction-A is used.
Let C ⊆ Z n p be a linear code, where p is a prime number. A lattice constructed based on Construction-A and from the code C is defined by
where φ : Z n p → R n is the embedding function which maps a vector in Z n p to its real version [29] . In this paper, we use binary codes and lattices with p = 2. where H = [h 1 , . . . , h (n−k) ] t is the parity check matrix of C [22] , [31] , [37] .
The generator matrix of a 1-level LDPC lattice based on Construction-A is
where 0 stands for the zero block, I for an identity block and G C = I k A k×(n−k) k×n is the systematic form of the generator matrix of C [31] . It can be shown that
In the sequel, we refer 1-level LDPC lattice as LDPC lattices without mentioning the level of the construct.
In order to find a decoding method for these family of lattices, a translated sublattice of which is generated by (3) , is considered [31] . Therefore, in the encoding method of LDPC lattices, the components of any codeword c of the binary code C are converted into ±1, by 2c−1 (0 is converted VOLUME 5, 2017 to −1 and 1 is converted to 1). Then, the sublattice (C) of lattice consists of the vectors of the form
where 1 = (1, . . . , 1). For any λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ (C), it can be shown that (C) is closed under the following addition [31] 
Hence, the encoding procedure of an integer row vector ξ ∈ Z n , using the generator matrix (3), can be performed as
where E is encoding function and E(ξ ) is a point of the lattice (C) [31] . Indeed, the generator matrix of (C) is 2G and det( (C)) = 2 2n−k . Moreover,
A special sub-class of LDPC lattices that uses a QC-LDPC code as its underlying code, has a practical decoder with low implementation complexity and memory requirements [28] . Moreover, since the QC property decreases the key size, it is interesting to focus on the quasi cyclic version of this lattices for cryptographic objectives.
B. QC-MDPC LATTICES
In this section, we consider QC-MDPC codes as underlying codes in Construction-A lattices and introduce QC-MDPC lattices. MDPC codes [15] display some interesting features of being less structured than codes that are traditionally encountered in code-based cryptography and being close to random codes. Therefore, they tend to become a serious choice in cryptography. Furthermore, designing the code-based encryption scheme based on MDPC codes, resists to some attacks like key recovery attacks which are based on Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithms [38] , [39] to find low-weight codewords in LDPC code-based encryption schemes [11] , [13] . In order to increase the efficiency of the cryptosystems, the QC-MDPC codes in which each block in their parity-check matrix is a circulant matrix, have been used.
A regular (n, r, w)-MDPC code is a linear code of length n and co-dimension r that is defined by an r × n parity-check matrix (r < n), where each row has weight w = O( √ n log n). Indeed, the MDPC codes can be viewed as LDPC codes whose parity-check matrices have higher density [15] . However, they are still less sparse than the parity-check matrix of classical block codes.
Definition 2: A QC-MDPC lattice is a lattice based on Construction-A that is derived from a binary QC-MDPC code C as its underlying code. Equivalently, x ∈ Z n belongs to if and only if H qc x t = 0 (mod 2), where H qc is the quasi-cyclic parity-check matrix of C.
Throughout the paper, the weight of a vector refers to its Hamming weight and a circulant matrix H of order b is a b × b matrix obtained by right cyclic shifts of the first row h = (h 0 , . . . , h b−1 ). It is well-known that the addition and multiplication of matrices preserve the circulant structure of them.
Proposition 1 [40] : The algebra of b × b circulant matrices with entries belonging to a field F is denoted by (C b (F), +, ×) and is isomorphic to the polynomial algebra
Corollary 1 [40] : A b × b circulant matrix H defined by its first row h, is invertible if and only if h(x) is coprime to x b − 1. In particular, the weight of the first row h is necessarily odd.
Encoding procedure of QC-MDPC lattices is the same as LDPC lattice that is performed using Eq. (7). In the following, we present a hard decision message passing algorithm which is suitable for the QC-MDPC lattices. There are some methods based on bit-flipping algorithm in literature [41] , [42] that we can use them to present the decoding algorithm of QC-MDPC lattices. Since we use the QC-MDPC codes as the underlying codes in these lattices, we present our hard decision lattice decoding algorithm based on iterative bitflipping decoding algorithm of QC-MDPC codes in [16] . In Algorithm 1, the non-zero positions of the sparse matrix H qc are stored in an r × w matrix denoted by R. Furthermore, unsatisfied parity-check equations are denoted by u.p.c. and the maximum number of unsatisfied parity-check equations is denoted by Max upc . The syndrome of the message is computed at each iteration of the bit-flipping algorithm and then the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations associated to each bit of the message is computed. Then, each bit associated to more than or equal to b = Max upc − δ unsatisfied equations, for a small positive integer δ, is flipped. This process is repeated until either a maximum number of iteration I max is reached or the syndrome becomes a zero-vector. If the algorithm fails to decode, the value of δ is decreased by 1 and the process is restarted. According to [16] , considering the threshold value b = Max upc − δ with δ ≈ 5, the overall number of iterations is reduced to approximately 10. Algorithm 1 has the complexity O(nwI ), where w stands for the row weight of the parity check matrix H qc and I is the average number of iterations.
On the other hand, a soft decision message passing algorithm, SPA, presented in [28] , is also practical for decoding the QC-MDPC lattices. According to FIGURE2 and for a given specific QC-MDPC code, the SPA outperforms BFA. However, BFA requires fewer iterations and on average just half the time to decode an erroneous codeword. Therefore, the time complexity of BFA is lower than that of the SPA. Indeed, the BFA is more suitable for cryptographic purposes. while It ≤ I max or H qcĉ t = 0 do 13: Max upc ← 0 14:
counter stores the number of u.p.c. for each bit. for i = 1 : w do 19: counter R j,i = counter R j,i + 1 Counting the u.p.c. for each bit. 20: end for 21: end if 22: end for 23: Max upc ← max 1≤k≤n (counter k ) 24: for i = 1 : n do 25 :
Flipping the appropriate bits. 
The decoded value is r. 40 : end procedure
III. QC-MDPC LATTICE BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In this work, we focus on a QC-MDPC lattice and introduce a GGH-like public key encryption scheme based on these lattices. We show that the proposed encryption scheme is more efficient compared to other lattice-based encryption schemes. Indeed, we indicate that efficient encoding of these lattices leads to a high speed encryption procedure in comparison to the other lattice-based encryption schemes. Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm for solving CVP in these lattices that is suitable for a legitimate receiver in decryption step which results in an efficient decryption algorithm. The low complexity of the encoding algorithm and decoding algorithm (for finding CVP) in these lattices, motivates us to use these lattices for encrypting messages in high dimensions.
In our public key scheme, Bob chooses a random regular (n, r, w)-QC-MDPC code with parity-check matrix H qc and constant row weight w, where n = n 0 b and r = b for some non-negative integer n 0 . Therefore, there exist b × b circulant matrices H 0 , . . . , H n 0 −1 such that
Let the number of nonzero elements in the rows of H i be w i such that
, that particularly implies that w n 0 −1 is odd [40] ). Then according to [28] , the generator matrix of the corresponding lattice is
where
. . , n 0 − 2. Now, the scheme requires an n × n matrix G as its public key which is to be suitably chosen. A good choice for the public key of this scheme can be HNF of the lattice's generator matrix (lattice basis). From computational point of view, the HNF basis of a lattice can be efficiently computed from any other lattice basis. On the other hand, from security point of view, the HNF basis gives no information about the primary basis of the lattice [36] .
Remark 1: By definition, for the (QC-)LDPC lattices we have HNF(G ) = G . We compute the orthogonality defect of the public generator matrix G to evaluate its orthogonality. Since det(G ) = 2 n−k and
Since the sub-matrix A of G in (10) is quasi cyclic,
, where p i1 is the first row of the matrix P t i in the sub-matrix A. On the other hand, A is a binary dense matrix and so p i1 2. This yields orth-defect(G ) (
k (a lower bound for orthogonality defect of G ). Due to the orth-defect(G ) 1, the public basis G is so far from an orthogonal basis and it is a bad basis for finding CVP in the lattice . Hence, G is considered as Bob's public key.
In our scheme, the generator matrix G and particularly just the sub-matrix A in (10) , is published as the public key. The matrix A has a binary alphabet which provides efficiency of the public key size. Moreover, due to the quasi cyclic form of A, we only save the first rows of its circulant matrices. As a consequence, the key size of the public key is k = (n 0 − 1)b.
On the other hand, the private key of the scheme consists of the parity-check matrix H qc . The QC-MDPC lattice with the parity-check matrix (9) is given by n 0 vectors from F b 2 with a total Hamming weight w. Since any circulant matrix is completely determined by its first row, we save the first row of the parity-check matrix as the private key. Thus, the size of the private key is equal to n = bn 0 .
During the key generation step we consider b as an odd prime number for security reasons [14] . The private key is obtained by taking the first row of H qc randomly until at least one of the b × b circulant matrices H i , for i = 0, . . . , n 0 − 1, is invertible.
There might be several equivalent parity-check matrices for a single QC-MDPC code. Therefore, an attacker does not necessarily have to find exactly the same secret keys for decrypting any ciphertext.
Encryption and decryption are presented as follows.
A. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
To encrypt a message, it is encoded as an integral vector m ∈ Z n . Then a random noise vector e of length n is chosen. In code-based cryptosystems, a random error vector is chosen such that its Hamming weight is equal to the error correction capability of the underlying code, and the size of its entries is limited to the size of the base finite field (F q ), while the error vectors in lattice-based cryptosystems have less structure and they are only required to be small. Since, the QC-MDPC lattices are constructed from codes, the error vectors used in the proposed scheme have some structures which is demonstrated in the sequel. Based on encoding procedure of these lattices, Eq. (7), the ciphertext is computed as
where the error vector e is drawn i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution with variance σ 2 , i.e. e ∼ N (0, σ 2 ).
We choose a suitable value for the noise variance σ 2 such that the decoding failure rate in decryption is negligible (e.g. 10 −7 ). This will be explained more in Section V.
The ciphertext is a lattice point belonging to the infinite lattice constellation (C) that is perturbed by the error vector e. Since, the encryption operations perform in the real numbers R, the entries of the ciphertext can be too big. To make this scheme practical, the lattice points should belong to a finite constellation which keeps the entries of the ciphertext small enough. It is provided by selecting a set of lattice points that are in a specific limited region called a shaping region. Indeed, instead of mapping the message vector m to the lattice point λ = mG in an infinite lattice , we can map the message m into a lattice point λ = m G (with m as a function of m) inside the shaping region. This operation of selecting these lattice points is referred to as shaping method.
Some known shaping methods in the literature are hypercube shaping, Voronoi (nested lattice) shaping and spherical shaping. In this paper, we consider an efficient hypercube shaping algorithm that has minimum complexity among other shaping methods for QC-LDPC lattices to obtain finite lattice constellations [32] .
To perform shaping, the integer vector m is restricted to the following finite constellation
where L i 's are even integers. Then we consider a new lattice codeword
is an n × n diagonal matrix and the new integer message is m = m − tL. The vector t is an integer vector of length n which depends on the employed shaping method.
In hypercube shaping, t is chosen such that the new lattice codeword components are constrained to lie in an n-dimensional hypercube around the origin, i.e. |λ i | ≤ L i , for i = 1, . . . , n. By solving the system of linear equations λ = m G , according to [32] (Section V-A), we have t i = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where a j,i−k is (j, i − k)-th entry of the matrix A in Equation (3). After finding the shaped lattice point m G in , we compute the lattice vector 2m G − 1 in (C) (the lattices we consider in our cryptosystem) and then the following ciphertext is sent to the receiver
As a consequence, the shaped vectors of (C) are uniformly distributed over hypercube 2L − 1 where,
Note that, for the storage and computational purposes, the error vectors must be quantized. We use 16-level quantization for reducing the space complexity.
We assume that the ciphertext y is transmitted through the noiseless channel. Therefore, if the noise vector e is chosen properly, then the authorized receiver can remove e with high probability. In Section V, we explain the amount of standard deviation σ for e such that the receiver recover the message correctly. 
B. DECRYPTION ALGORITHM
To decryption the ciphertext y and recover the message m, the following algorithm is used. Since, the vector y = 2m G − 1 + e is a shaped lattice point generated by G and perturbed by e, the decryption is done by solving the closest vector problem with input vector y.
Since the variance of the vector e is chosen properly, the vector λ = 2m G − 1 can be derived by employing the iterative SPA ( [28] ) or BFA (Algorithm 1) for decoding of QC-MDPC lattices using the private key H qc . Then, the original message vector m is obtained from the shaped lattice codeword λ = 2m G − 1 by employing the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Obtaining Original Message
3:
end if 9: end for 10: return m = (r 1 , . . . , r n ). 11: end procedure FIGURE1 shows the block diagram of the proposed public key encryption scheme based on QC-MDPC lattices.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the security of the suggested scheme and consider possible attacks on the lattice-based cryptosystems for our cryptosystem. Generally, the latticebased attacks are applied to the public key cryptosystem by reducing a special instance of SVP or CVP to the problem of recovering the private information (the private key or the message) in the cryptosystem.
The security of our cryptosystem is ensured under the following two assumptions: (a) Hardness of the bounded distance decoding or, equivalently, CVP and (b) Indistinguishability of the generator matrix of a QC-MDPC code from random ones. Indeed, it has been shown that there is no efficient algorithm to distinguish the key generator matrix of QC-MDPC codes from any other random matrix with the same size [16] . From the security point of view, our cryptosystem enjoys one-wayness property which means that given a randomly chosen ciphertext, it is hard to recover the corresponding plaintext.
Generally, we can categorize the possible attacks on the proposed cryptosystem into two classes:
Message Recovery Attack: Decode the message m from y = 2m G − 1 + e, directly.
Key Recovery Attack: Recover the original structure of the secret key H qc from the public generator matrix G .
In our scheme with Gaussian noise, it is promising to consider possible attacks on lattice-based cryptosystems that employ the Euclidean metric.
A. MESSAGE RECOVERY ATTACK
Decoding attack or message recovery attack on the proposed cryptosystem is equivalent to solving CVP, a hard lattice problem, in the QC-MDPC lattice.
In the sequel, we present some message recovery attacks which are possible on our cryptosystem.
1) ROUND-OFF ATTACK
This attack was first applied to GGH cryptosystem [4] . When the public key of a GGH-like cryptosystem is invertible, this attack can exploit its inverse to retrieve the message without any knowledge of the private key. In the following, we investigate the success probability of the attack on our cryptosystem.
Let the ciphertext y = 2m G −1+e is given. The attacker begins with encryption equation by adding both side with 1 and then multiplying both side by G −1 to obtain the equation (y + 1)G −1 = 2m + eG −1 . If he can estimate the vector v := eG −1 , then he will recover the message m . To avoid this attack, the size of the search space that an attacker needs to seek the correct vector v must be large enough. For this purpose we do as follows. First, we denote the following notations:
• g j is the j-th column of G −1 .
• g ij is the (i, j)-th entry of G −1 .
• h(x) is the differential entropy of the random variable x.
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Thus, each entry of v is written as v j = e · g j = n i=1 e i g ij . Since we consider e ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), the expectation and variance of the random variables v j are as follows:
To simplify the computations of search space, we assume that all entries in v are independent and each of them is Gaussian, i.e. v j ∼ N (0, σ 2 g j 2 ). In this case, the size of the search space is 2 h(v) . The differential entropy of a Gaussian random variable x with variance σ 2 is h(x) = 1 2 log(π eσ 2 ) [4] . As a result,
Hence, 2 h(v) = (π e) n 2 σ n n j=1 g j determines the size of the search space. As a consequence, the feasibility of this attack depends on the variance of the noise e and the public basis G .
According to (8), we have σ 2 =
in the proposed scheme. Then 
In the next section, we show that the size of the search space for the considered parameters of our scheme is large enough to make this attack infeasible.
2) NGUYEN'S ATTACK
In 1997, Nguyen presented an message recovery attack against GGH lattice-based cryptosystem [43] . This attack is restricted to the condition that all entries of the error vector have the same absolute value. Indeed, in a CVP-based cryptosystem like GGH encryption with the encryption function y = E B (m) = Bm + e, where B is the public lattice basis, if |e i | = |σ | for i = 0, . . . , n, then y + s = Bm (mod 2σ ) such that s = (σ, · · · , σ ). In this case, the message m 2σ = m (mod 2σ ) can be computed and the problem of finding the closest vector in L(B) to y, perturbed by e = {±σ } n , is reduced to the problem of finding a closest vector in L(B) to y − Bm 2σ 2σ which is perturbed by a vector
Hence, the original CVP instance is reduced to a simpler CVP instance and applying the embedding technique [4] can solve this simplified CVP. Moreover, the solution of the simplified CVP instance, e , yields the solution of the original one i.e. the error vector e. Then, the message m is retrievable.
In our proposed scheme, we consider the error vector to be a vector such that e = (±σ, · · · , ±σ ). Therefore, this attack is infeasible on our cryptosystem.
3) LEE-HAHN'S ATTACK
In many cases, it is possible that some partial information of the message are known in advance (e.g. stereotyped messages or known formatted messages). In [44] , Lee and Hahn show that if the attacker knows some entries of the message m (corresponding to the ciphertext y) or can guess them, then their method can be applied on GGH-like cryptosystems to recover entire the message. Indeed, the decryption problem which is a CVP instance is reduced to a simpler CVP instance. We describe below this attack on the proposed scheme:
Assume that m 1 , which is the first j entries of m = (m 1 m 2 ), is known (equivalently m 1 of m = (m 1 m 2 ) is known). Also, let (G ) 1 be the first j rows of G and (G ) 2 be the rest rows. Then, the following equation holds
So,
Now, y = 2m 2 (G ) 2 −1+e is a CVP instance of different lattice generated by (G ) 2 . Since the lattice generated by (G ) 2 is a sublattice of the lattice and has smaller rank, that is n−j, the new CVP instance is simpler than the original one. However, the error vector in both CVP instances are the same. Using the embedding technique, if the simplified CVP is solved successfully, then the original CVP instance will be solved.
This type of attack can be avoided if we use randomization technique in the proposed scheme, e.g. combining a random string with the message.
4) BROADCAST ATTACKS
In the multi user setting, a single message can be encrypted by different users with different public keys. The attacker in this case, without any knowledge about the private key of the receivers, only by observing the ciphertexts, can derive the message corresponding to them. In 1988, the first broadcast attack against RSA public key cryptosystems was introduced by Håstad [45] . This attack was efficiently proposed on the GGH-like lattice-based cryptosystems in 2009 [46] .
It can be proved that finding the SVP on the intersection of lattices is easier than that in the initial lattice which have the same solution [46] . Therefore, intersecting lattices are useful for cryptanalysis and some practical attacks on lattice-based cryptosystems are inspired by this fact. There are two types of the broadcast attack against GGH-like cryptosystems which are described below for our proposed scheme.
Let a single message m is encrypted by different public keys G i , for i = 1, . . . , r and the ciphertexts are y i = 2mG i − 1 + e. The challenge is to recover the message m.
1) Type A of broadcast attack : the following algorithm uses the fact that an intersection of lattices can simplify the SVP and solve the challenge.
• Compute G i =
• Find (m, 1) as a shortest vector of the lattice L.
2) Type B of broadcast attack: this algorithm uses the embedding technique to find the CVP as the solution of the challenge.
•
• Find the closest vector v to y in the lattice L(G).
To avoid these attacks we can add a random part to each message. In this way every two messages are not equal with a reasonable probability. Thus the proposed scheme is secured against the broadcast attack.
5) INFORMATION SET DECODING (ISD) ATTACKS
The security assessment of code-based public key encryption schemes is based on the ISD attacks. In this attack an attacker attempts to exploit a general decoding algorithm to decode the public code and finds the intentional error vector affecting each ciphertext. The most powerful attacks against LDPC and MDPC code-based cryptosystems are those using ISD algorithms. These probabilistic algorithms find low weight codewords in a linear block code [38] , [39] , [47] . The number of operations which are required to successfully complete the algorithm and find a codeword with weight t in a binary C[n, k] code is denoted by WF BJMM (n, k, t) (Becker-Joux-May-Meurer variant, one of the best known ISD algorithms) [47] .
In the following, we extend this type of attack, that is applied on code-based cryptosystems, to our QC-MDPC lattice-based scheme. In our scheme, the ciphertext is a perturbed lattice point y = 2m G − 1 + e. Based on Section II, the lattice point λ = 2m G − 1 in (C) can be written as λ = (2c − 1) + 4z, where z ∈ Z n and c is a codeword of a binary QC-MDPC code C ⊆ F n 2 . The purpose of this message recovery attack is to estimate the error vector e and then retrieve the message vector m from y − e.
In the decryption procedure, SPA or BFA is used for decoding the QC-MDPC lattices. To avoid a possible threat (the reason is explained in the next section), we assume that SPA is used in the decryption procedure. Therefore, computing the input of the SPA decoder, that is the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) vector γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ), is the first step for decrypting the ciphertext y in which [28] 
. (15) Then, the attacker performs the so-called hard decision on the computed LLR values as follows:
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,ĉ = c + e is the codeword c ∈ C which has been affected by the error pattern e ∈ Z n 2 . To estimate the codeword c, we should find the error pattern e . In this case, we face with a problem in the code based encryption schemes. Thus, similar to the code-based encryption schemes, the error pattern e affecting the codeword c can be found by applying the ISD algorithm [36] . Indeed, e is the unique minimum weight codeword in a (n, k + 1) linear code, generated by
where G C is the generator matrix of the binary QC-MDPC code C. After finding e by ISD algorithm, the original codeword c is recovered asĉ − e . In the case that c is estimated correctly, then the attacker should decode the vector 4z + e for estimation of z. Therefore, estimate it asẑ = , where e i ∼ N (0, 1), for i = 0, . . . , n [28] . Let Q be the Q-function, the tail probability of the standard normal distribution. Then, the probability of that |e i | ≥ 2 σ is equal to 2Q(2/σ ) which is negligible for the proposed value for σ in Section V. Thus, the lattice pointλ = c + 4ẑ is correctly recovered with high probability. Finally, the message m is retrieved by adding the all one vector 1 and multiplying 1 2 G −1 toλ. As a consequence, if the codeword c is estimated correctly, then with high probability the message m is retrieved correctly in the proposed parameters. Hence, the number of operations which are required to successfully complete the algorithm is the same as the work factor of ISD attack for code-based cryptosystems. Due to the quasi cyclic structure of the underlying code, it can be computed by [16] 
in which t * is the total number of bit errors inĉ i.e. the Hamming weight of e . It is shown that the value of t * follows a binomial distribution with meant = function, and the work factor of the attack is considered the worst case when t * =t [19] . Hence, by using the proposed value for σ among other parameters and computingt, the work factor of this attack is obtained.
6) THE ADAPTIVE CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACK AND CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
In this time, the problem of enhancing security of our proposed (not semantically secure) cryptosystem with such useful property is arisen. The semantic security against chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is one of the most natural practical requirements for the public key cryptosystems. According to [48] , if the plaintext used in the McEliece encryption scheme is padded with some random string, then this cryptosystem will be secure against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), under the standard assumptions. By this padding, the chosen plaintext attack can be prevented for our McEliece-like encryption, too.
A further stronger security notion is IND-CCA2 (indistinguishability against (a-posteriori) chosen-ciphertext attacks), in which an adversary may access the decryption oracle even after the challenge ciphertext is given. Our proposed scheme is insecure against CCA2. Since if a ciphertext y = 2m 1 G − 1 + e is given, then the attacker can input y + 2m 2 G − 1, for an arbitrary message m 2 , to the decryption oracle. Therefore, he find outm = m 1 + m 2 as the output of decryption oracle. Thus, the original message m 1 is recovered by m 1 =m − m 2 .
Regarding the conversions from one-way cryptosystems to semantically secure ones, Fujisaki and Okamoto present an efficient conversion from McEliece one-way public key cryptosystem to a public key cryptosystem that is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) in the random oracle model [49] . By employing the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [49] , our McEliece-like proposed scheme convert to an IND-CCA asymmetric encryption scheme.
B. KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
The purpose of this type of attacks is retrieving the secret key from the public data. It is proved that the HNF basis of the lattice is unique and gives no information about the original generator matrix that constructs the lattice . Indeed, it can be proved that any information about private basis G that is computed from the G = HNF(G ) basis can also be efficiently computed from any other basis of the lattice . Consequently, the brute-force attack will be impossible in practice.
On the other hand, we should consider security of our encryption scheme against dual code attacks that are powerful attacks applied on code-based cryptosystems. In these attacks, recovering the key is equivalent to exhibit one codeword of the QC-MDPC code (underlying code of the QC-MDPC lattice) of weight w.
1) DUAL CODE ATTACK
This attack is applied on code-based cryptosystems with an LDPC code as its underlying code. It exploits the low density property of the parity-check matrix of LDPC codes. Since the parity-check matrix of a code is corresponding to the generator matrix of its dual code, the main idea of the attack is to search the low weight codewords belonging to its dual code. Indeed, the rows of the parity-check matrix of an LDPC code are corresponding to the low weight codewords in its dual code. Therefore, an efficient way to recover the secret paritycheck matrix of an LDPC code-based encryption scheme is to search for its rows in its dual code [11] .
The work factor of this attack to find a codeword of weight w in the dual code with length n and dimension n − k using ISD algorithms is equal to WF BJMM (n, n − k, w). In QC-LDPC codes with parity-check matrices in the form (9), the attack complexity is reduced by a factor equal to the inverse of the number of rows of H qc [16] :
A solution to avoid such attacks consists of increasing the column weight of the parity-check matrix to impose more difficulty for an attacker to find the rows of H qc in the dual of the public code. Since, we use a QC-MDPC code as the underlying code of our lattices, this attack is computationally infeasible on our proposed cryptosystem for the recommended parameters given in the next section.
2) OTHER ATTACKS
Another key recovery attack on QC-MDPC-McEliece cryptosystem has been presented in [17] . The proposed attack recovers the secret key from the decoding errors of a bitflipping-type iterative decoder. Recently, it is shown that a similar dependency between the secret keys in the QC-LDPC code based cryptosystem [13] and the failure probability of a decoding algorithm exist, even when a soft-decision decoding algorithm is used [18] . Indeed, if the binary error vector e used in QC-MDPC-McEliece and QC-LDPC-McEliece cryptosystems has a distance d between two of its nonzero entries, then the distance d exists in the corresponding circulant block of the secret matrix H qc . Therefore, a bit-flipping algorithm fails to decode a message with error vector e. This behavior could be utilized in attacking these code based cryptosystems [17] , [18] .
The proposed scheme resists against the aforementioned attacks, due to the Euclidean structure of the noise vector. Generally, all possible attacks that exploit the binary structure of the noise vector (like those presented in [17] , [18] , [40] ), cannot be applied on our proposed encryption scheme.
A key-recovery attack against McEliece-like cryptosystems that employ quasi-cyclic property of codes, is introduced in [14] . However, this attack is only applicable to quasi-cyclic codes whose length and dimension is a multiple of a power of 2. The length and the dimension of the code used in our proposed encryption scheme are chosen such that the necessary condition of this attack does not hold.
V. PRACTICAL PARAMETERS
In this section, we present some practical parameters for our proposed scheme. We suggest the parameters of the proposed scheme, corresponding to the security levels 80 and 128, in TABLE 1. The three parameter sets are proposed for n 0 = 2, n 0 = 3 and n 0 = 4, equivalent to different code rates 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, respectively. The smallest key size is achieved for n 0 = 2 and by increasing n 0 , better code rates are obtained at the price of less compact key sizes. These parameters are proposed based on the work factors of all possible attacks on the encryption scheme and the simulation results in FIGURE2, FIGURE3 and TABLE 2. In the sequel, we explain how to choose these parameters for the proposed scheme. The success of the attacks introduced in the previous section depends on two factors: the variance σ 2 of the noise vector e and the public basis of the lattice.
In general, we choose σ in such a way that the decoding failure rate in the decryption process be at most 10 −7 . Since there is not any precise analysis for estimating the error correction capability of the decoding method for QC-MDPC lattices, we go through the exhaustive simulation to estimate the performance of a QC-MDPC lattice in terms of its decoding failure rate (DFR). Therefore, it suffices to decrease the value of noise variance σ until achieving an adequate DFR, e.g., 10 −7 . Thus, the decoder fails to retrieve the messages with a negligible probability.
We consider two decoding algorithms for QC-MDPC lattices in this paper, namely SPA and BFA. FIGURE2 indicates the symbol error performance of a QC-MDPC lattice with (n, k) = (9602, 4801) using the SPA and the BFA for decoding. We present the error probabilities in terms of the cryptographic parameters in TABLE 2 that shows σ < 0.3705 is suitable for a (9602, 4801, 90)-QC-MDPC lattice. In all simulations we have assumed the number of decoding iterations as 50. Indeed, on average 10 iterations is needed in BFA to decode an erroneous lattice point and it encounters more decoding errors. Based on FIGURE2, SPA has lower decoding failures and better decoding performance. Therefore, we can apply a perturbation vector with larger variance in the encryption step and achieve more security. Thus, it is preferable to use SPA in the decryption process.
In general, the symbol error rate (SER) of a binary Construction-A lattices is lower bounded by 2Q( πe·VNR 2 2 k/n ) [28] . This implies that at any fixed VNR, the SER of QC-LDPC lattices does not tend to 0 when VOLUME 5, 2017 the dimension n grows to infinity [28] . The QC-MDPC lattices are the binary Construction-A lattices. Therefore, we consider this lower bound in our simulations. According to FIGURE2, in SPA for VNR > 4.5 and in BFA for VNR > 5.3 the lower bound touches the performance curves of a (9602, 4801)-QC-MDPC lattice. Moreover, the lower bound for a (10779, 7186)-QC-MDPC lattice (with a rate 2/3 for binary QC-MDPC code as its underlying code) is shown, too. From practical point of view and in order to avoid touching the lower bound in the performance curve for SERs more than 10 −7 , it is preferable to use a QC-MDPC code with higher rate (more than 2/3). For the second factor, that is the lattice public basis, according to Remark 1, we have HNF(G ) = G and orth-defect(2G )
1. Indeed, for a QC-MDPC lattice with parameters' values n = 9602, k = 4801, w = 90, b = 4801, and n 0 = 2, we have orth-defect(G ) 2 4800 1. Therefore, the public basis G is a bad basis for solving CVP in the lattice . Indeed, without knowledge of the private paritycheck matrix and knowing only the bad basis G , solving the CVP in QC-MDPC lattices with dimensions more than 9602, using an optimal decoding is computationally infeasible for an attacker.
On the other hand, using these parameters the Roundoff attack is defeated. Since, the decoding failure rate in our lattices for VNR ≈ 3.4 (or 5.3312 dB) is in the order of 10 −7 , then the size of the search space is 2 h(v) (2 (14403/2) )/(3.4) 4801 ≈ 10 1784 which is large enough.
VI. EFFICIENCY A. COMPLEXITY
In this section we analyze the complexity of our encryption and decryption algorithms. Encryption is performed by converting the message m to m through the shaping method and encoding m according to (7) . Then, the intentional error vector e is added to the encoded vector. Therefore, the encryption complexity can be estimated by
. (18) Let w c be the average row weight of G . Then, the computational complexity of the hypercube shaping is of order O(nw c ).
For encoding an integer vector u in the QC-MDPC lattices, we divide it into two parts u 1 and u 2 of lengths k = (n 0 − 1)b and n − k = b, respectively. According to Equation (3), the encoded vector is λ = (u 1 , u 1 A + 2u 2 ). The multiplication 2u 2 is performed by concatenating one zero bit to the least significant bit of u 2 . Therefore, we only consider the complexity of computing u 1 A. Assume that the components values of the vector u are restricted to the finite set of integers {−l, . . . , l − 1}, for l ∈ Z. Let w v be the maximum column weight of A in G . Then, the required number of bits for computing each component of the vector uG is N b = log 2 (lw v + 2l) and the storage requirement for encoding is n( log 2 (lw v + 2l) + 1) [28] . Let N a , N x and N o be the numbers of AND, XOR and OR gates in each N b bits full-adder, respectively. Hence, based on TABLE 3, the number of binary operations for calculating C encoding (m ) is estimated as O(n − k). Consequently, according to (18) , the encryption complexity is linear in terms of the dimension of the lattice, n.
Similarly, the decryption complexity is expressed as:
where MOD operation has been introduced in Algorithm 2.
The decoding algorithm of QC-LDPC lattices has a low implementation complexity and low memory requirements. Its computational complexity is of order O(nd v I ), where I is the maximum number of iterations required by the decoding algorithm to correct the errors and d v is the average column weight of the parity-check matrix H qc [31] . The information integer component m i , for i = 0, . . . , n, are recovered from m i after multiplication by the matrix G −1 followed by a simple modulo operation that is explained in Algorithm 2. Therefore, C MOD (λ ) = C mult (G −1 ). According to (4), the matrix G −1 is a QC matrix similar to G . Therefore, we use a circuit similar to the encoding circuit and its complexity is exactly equal to the complexity of encoding. Hence, C MOD (λ ) = O(n − k). As a consequence, based on (19), the total computational complexity of decryption is linear in the dimension of the lattice.
Next, we summarize the operation characteristics of the proposed scheme in terms of its parameters in TABLE 4.
For simplicity, we consider L i = L, for i = 1, . . . , n and restrict the integer vector m to the following finite constellation m i ∈ {−L/2, . . . , L/2 − 1}, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, Equation (11) gives the plaintext size that is given in TABLE 4. Using Equation (13), (14) and considering the finite constellation for shaped vectors in (C) to be 2L − 1, the number of bits required to derive a ciphertext is
where q is the quantization value of the components of the noise vector. We usually consider q = 16. Moreover, based on Section III, the size of the public and private keys is equal to k = (n 0 − 1)b and n = bn 0 , respectively.
B. COMPARISON
In this section, we present a comparison between our proposed scheme and other well-known code-based and lattice-based encryption schemes. This comparison is given in TABLE 5.
The GGH encryption scheme requires the application of lattice basis reduction algorithms on a high dimensional matrix with very large entries. The large key size and high complexity of encryption, decryption and key generation algorithms are major problems of the GGH encryption scheme. Our proposed scheme is a GGH-like encryption scheme in which using an efficient lattice code leads to an efficient key generation procedure. Moreover, according to TABLE 4, the encryption and the decryption complexities of our proposed scheme are both linear in terms of the dimension of the lattice, while they are quadratic for GGH cryptosystem. The public key size of the GGH scheme is approximately 330 kilobytes using a lattice with dimension n = 400, while this size is 4801 bits for our proposed scheme in dimension 9602. Thus, the proposed cryptosystem outperforms the GGH cryptosystem in terms of encryption and decryption speed and the key sizes.
The encryption and the decryption complexities are the most crucial parts of the lattice-based encryption schemes. Having low complexity encryption and decryption algorithms, which are both linear in terms of the lattice dimension, is one of the advantages of our proposed scheme. According to the results of TABLE 5, the proposed lattice-based scheme is the most efficient lattice-based public key scheme, with significant savings in the encryption and decryption complexities.
We point out that the key size of the proposed scheme is not smaller than NTRU which is one of the most practical lattice-based cryptosystems. But, the underlying lattice in our cryptosystem has a special structure which increases the efficiency significantly.
Another parameter that measures the efficiency of a cryptosystem is its message expansion. Let |C| and |P| be the sizes of ciphertext space and plaintext space, respectively. Then, the message expansion can be calculated as log 2 |C| log 2 |P| . For our cryptosystem this ratio is (n − k) log 2 (2L + 1) + k log 2 (L + 1) + n log 2 q n log 2 (L/2) . For a (9602, 4801, 90)-QC-MDPC lattice with L = 256 and q = 16 this ratio is almost equal to 1.7. For the smallest value of L which is 4, the message expansion is equal to 3.7. Moreover, it can be shown that the message expansion approaches 1 as L approaches infinity. Therefore, the message expansion of our cryptosystem belongs to the interval [1, 3.7] , for L ∈ {2 k | k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2}. These values are summarized in TABLE 6 for different values of L.
In comparison with NTRU cryptosystem whose message expansion is log p q ≈ 5.05 with p = 3 and q = 256, the message expansion of our encryption scheme is smaller. TABLE 5 indicates the validity of this statement for other candidates of CBC and LBC in comparative parameters.
Comparing to the existing code based cryptosystems, to the best of our knowledge QC-MDPC McEliece is the most efficient one. However it is insecure under the attack proposed in [17] . But, our proposed cryptosystem is secure against the most known lattice-based and code-based attacks due to the use of a real noise vector in the encryption phase. Thus, the proposed scheme has not only a comparative efficiency but also more flexibility and security advantages over its counterparts.
Recently, a lattice-based public key encryption scheme has been proposed in which a Latin square LDLC is used in a GGH-like scheme. The private key set of this scheme is {H, P, U}, in which H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h d } is the generating set of the parity check matrix H n×n of the used LDLC with dimension n, P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p d } whose entry in p i -th column and i-th row of matrix P d×n is ''1'', where 1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤ p i ≤ n, and U is an n × n unimodular matrix, that is, an n × n integer matrix with determinant of unit magnitude [21] . Since, we need at least O(n 2 ) bits for storing the matrix U, the private key size of this cryptosystem will be at least O(n 2 ) bits in contrast to the author's claim as being O(n) bits [21] . The public key size of the Latin square LDLCbased public key encryption scheme is of order O(n 2 ) bits.
Thus, for the parity check matrix with n ≥ 1000 and degree d ≤ 10, this size is approximately 10 6 bits [21] . However, with a (9604, 4801)-QC-MDPC lattice, the public key size is 4801 bits that is significantly smaller than the Latin square LDLC-based cryptosystem.
In the Latin square LDLC-based cryptosystem, the authors have been considered the transmission rate instead of message expansion. They have claimed that the transmission rate of their scheme is one [21] . However, the transmission rate can only be defined for finite constellations and this scheme is based on infinite LDLCs. Unfortunately, the computation of the message expansion of the Latin square LDLC-based cryptosystem is not available in the literature. Indeed, the shaping step has been removed in the encryption process in order to increase the efficiency of the Latin square LDLC-based scheme. But it imposes a huge message expansion for the scheme. Thus, our proposed scheme outperforms the Latin square LDLC-based cryptosystem, too.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new family of lattices, namely QC-MDPC lattices, and proposed a new latticebased public key encryption scheme using these lattices. QC-MDPC lattices are practical in cryptographic applications, due to the sparseness of their corresponding paritycheck matrix, their quasi cyclic structure and the efficient encoding and decoding algorithms in high dimensions. The main advantages of the proposed encryption scheme are its low encryption and decryption complexities, which are both linear in the dimension of the lattice, a small message expansion and reasonable key size. Moreover, we have analyzed the security of our proposed scheme against the most known lattice-based and code-based attacks.
